tion of the game. Then it becomes possible to think of people as "maximizing normative utility" or, more plausibly, perhaps, as reaching some compromise in their behavior between valued game payoffs and valued social consequences that are in conflict with game payoffs; this is the avenue explored by Margolis (1982) in his important recent book.
Still, as Hardin (1977) , Campbell (1975) and others have pointed out, constraint in the interests of others (or of "society") is a weak reed on which to found the provision of important public goods, and interest attaches to institutions that ensure provision through reliance solely, or to a large extent, on the individual's interest in his or her game payoff. Under what circumstances will individuals who are not constrained by a concern for the welfare of others nevertheless act so as to provide valued public goods for the groups of which they are members? The logic by which selfinterested individuals can be guided by an "unseen hand" to serve the public interest in a world exclusively of private goods has been well understood since Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, but the logic by which those same individuals might be guided to serve the public interest in a world including public goods is only now being developed. This latter problem has, in recent years, produced the growing literature on "incentive compatible institutions" (for example, Smith 1979 ) and on, in particular, "demand revelation" as developed by Tideman and Tullock (1976) and Clarke (1980) . In experiments concerned with public good have been specified in the literature on public portunity for discussion-organizing themselves in a manner that invariably produced the public good in question, and that did so in an optimal manner without underprovision and with only little overprovision. We call the mechanism designating a minimal contributing set, or, more simply, the minimal contributing set. In what follows, we will specify a model of its working and will present data elaborating that model. We will argue that the minimal contributing set not only will produce public goods efficiently, but also that it will produce them with a minimum of internalized normative conflict and felt risk, emotions often associated with the decision to contribute to public goods in the absence of such a device. Its essentials are very simple: When the cost of the group's public good is assigned to a subset of members each of whose contribution is necessary to the production of the good, it is reasonable for each to contribute in fact. Although this logic can be recognized, we believe, in many familiar institutions, it does not appear to have been specified in the literature on public good provision.
Other authors, notably Olson (1965) and Buchanan (1965) , have pointed out how small groups can be expected to solve their public goods problems more readily than large groups. Olson argues that the cost of public goods will likely be less in small groups, and that, therefore, individual members will more probably be prepared to carry the full cost themselves. Buchanan argues that, granted some level of contributing is to be expected, individuals in small groups will recognize that their own choice will skew the distribution of behaviors in the group one way or the other, perhaps enough to make the expected value of contributing greater than of not contributing, whereas in large groups, the individual's own choice will have no significant impact.
These are important observations and help to explain the everyday fact that small groups often do appear to solve their public goods problems short of coercion or even much normative constraint. But many large organizations (universities come readily to mind) also appear to solve at least some of their public goods problems short of such "selective incentives" (Olson 1965 ), and we believe that they often do so by designating minimal contributing sets. Although the experiments from which our model is developed involved relatively few subjects (seven in each group), the logic of the model can be extended to show how large and relatively complex groups might organize themselves to ensure noncoercive provision of public goods. We will discuss that extension in a later section of this article.
The Experiment
Subjects were recruited by advertisements in a student daily newspaper and a metropolitan daily; care was taken that subjects did not sign up twice in the sequence of experiments, and that groups of friends did not participate in particular sessions. After they had read and signed the necessary release forms, subjects were seated (in groups of seven) in a single room with no communication permitted among them. As part of their instructions, they were told that they would leave the room at the end of the session one at a time, pick up their payment, if any, from a "payroom" down the corridor, and then be well clear of the general area before the next left the room-an assurance that, we hoped, would free subjects from any concern about interpersonal pressures after the experimental session was over.
Subjects in seven-person groups were given a $5 promissory note on entry and told that they had the option of contributing or not contributing that $5 toward what was a public good, a $10 benefit given to all seven whenever a specified number of contributions was met or exceeded.
The instructions read to subjects are given in the Appendix. In one condition (in which we ran 12 groups), subjects had a 10-minute period of free communication preceding individual decision making. Earlier work, in particular by Dawes, MacTavish, and Shaklee (1977), had demonstrated the importance of communication for increasing cooperation in such games, and we anticipated that it would have a similar effect in the present situation. It did, but by a process that was new to us. In every one of the 12 sessions, subjects used discussion to make a distributional decision about who would, and who would not, make contributions toward the public good in question (i.e., contribute their $5). In two sessions, groups specified more contributors than were minimally required.' But in the 10 others, exactly the minimal number required was specified, and the public good was subsequently provided in very nearly optimal amounts. This outcome was in marked contrast with the results of 34 sessions we ran in which discussion was not permitted. There the public good was not provided 35 percent of the time, and in the 22 sessions in which it was provided, there was overprovision 53 percent of the time.
Specifically, we ran three sessions in each of four similar conditions.2 In these 12 sessions, the subjects decided upon only three broad mechanisms for making the distributional decision. They were: a lottery-drawing the names out of a hat; volunteerism-waiting for the necessary number of contributors to volunteer for that role; and need-making some attempt to determine which of the several subjects were most in need of the additional $5 associated with noncontributing 'In one case, four contributors were specified when three were required. In the other, all seven were designated when only five were necessary.
'We crossed the number required for public good provision (three out of seven and five out of seven) with two conditions of relevance to the projects under waywhat were called "greed only" and "fear plus greed." In the "greed only" conditions, subjects who had contributed would have their $5 refunded if the public good were not forthcoming, meaning that they had no reason to fear being suckered. In the "greed-plus-fear" conditions, there would be no such refund, meaning that there was a reason to fear being suckered. Simmons and Polito (1981) found nearly identical results in these conditions, i.e., no evidence to support an hypothesis (from Brubaker 1975) that fear, rather than greed, was the major motivation behind free-riding behavior. These findings are written up in Simmons (1980) and Simmons and Polito (1981) . In presentation of our data, we have collapsed data for "greed only" and "fear plus greed" conditions because they did not produce significant differences; furthermore, they are tangential to the present problem. (ejg., whether members of the group had children or were without financial support). The incidence of these mechanisms in the three required and five required conditions is reported in Table 1 , which shows that the lottery was most frequently used. Table 2 reports public good provision in the 10 discussion sessions that produced the minimal contributing set and the 34 sessions without discussion and, therefore, without opportunity for specifying a minimal contributing set. It also indicates the incidence of overprovision and underprovision. As can be seen, the public good was optimally provided in seven of the ten minimal contributing set conditions. In three of the ten, a single individual who was not specified as a member of the contributing set contributed anyway, which resulted in cases of overprovision. There was not a single case of underprovision, the standard fear in public goods situations. On the other hand, without discussion and without specification of a minimal contributing set, the public good was optimally provided in only 10 of the 34 sessions (29.4 percent). Overprovision and underprovision were roughly comparable problems and, pooled over the three-required and fiverequired conditions, occurred 35 percent of the time. The data in Table 3 show that outcomes in the minimal contributing set cases were the result of overwhelming conformity, on the part of designated contributors and designated noncontributors alike, to the roles that had been specified for them by the group.
Possible Explanations
One hypothesis raises the possibility of side payments among our subjects. Had they recognized that we were paying out the largest sums when exactly the right number contributed, they might have used discussion as an opportunity, not only to decide who would and who would not contribute, but also to arrange for a (presumably egalitarian?) redistribution of the group's takings after the experiment was over. By this explanation, each designated contributor would go ahead We do not believe this possibility accounts for our findings. When we were signing up subjects, we were at pains to prevent natural groups of friends from participating in the same sessions, but even if we were not completely successful in this (there is something to be said for the security of having friends around in "psychology" experiments, and subjects might have lied to us), the experimenter was ready to end any discussion that seemed to be leading to the organization of side payments. Without such explicit discussion and organization, it seemed unlikely that even groups of good friends could count on each other to recognize the payoff parameters and to know that the proceeds would be shared afterward; as it was, the experimenter's prerogative of ending this kind of discussion never had to be exercised. Organization of side payments before the experimental session seemed precluded also by our care to schedule sessions using this procedure among other sessions that offered subjects a quite different decision problem. And, finally, we insisted that subjects leave the experimental room one at a time and be well clear of the general area before the next subject left, which placed a substantial barrier in the way of spontaneous organization after the session.
A second hypothesis is that the group's decision provided a "Schelling point," a prominent solution at which members could coordinate their choices in a situation where lack of coordination -each individual deciding unilaterally what to do -could clearly lead to bad consequences for all (Schelling 1960) . In this explanation, any such decision, even a contributing set that was not minimal, would be better than none.
A third hypothesis involves selective incentives. The minimal contributing set was, after all, set up via discussion, and that discussion might have been responsible for defining a kind of "social contract" whereby players felt obliged to adhere to the roles that had been specified. By this hypothesis, discussion could be thought of as changing the utility attached to defection so that it was no longer dominant; the critical matter was the group's decision making and whatever normative weight individuals, particularly those designated as contributors, chose to assign to it. We The Schelling-point hypothesis and the social contract one require extensive experimental work before their significance, if any, can be assessed; the processes involved are essentially psychological and cannot be evaluated without such work. There is, however, a further possibility that is attractive, first, because it is simple and elegant and, second, because it does not require us to assume that subjects are interested in any utility beyond that contained in the definition of the game. Although, as we have pointed out, we can expect normal human beings to be interested in such "non-game utility," explanations that do not require recourse to unmeasured (hence circularly defined) utilities are of particular interest-all the more so when they account for such striking effects as those described here. The factor in question we call criticalness.
Criticalness and the

Minimal Contributing Set
If the contributing set is in fact minimal-if the summed contributions of its members are sufficient to finance production of the public good but no more-each member will contribute because that is a necessary condition for him or her to enjoy the public good in question. If any one set member does not contribute, nobody will enjoy the good. Members of the minimal contributing set are, by this hypothesis, in the position of payers in a market for private goods who must decide whether or not to purchase some good with their own resources. If they do not pay the designated cost, they will not enjoy the good in question. The minimal contributing set, in short, denies players the opportunity to free ride and, therefore, ensures provision of the public good.
Criticalness, however, does not mean that contributing is a dominant strategy for designated contributors. A strategy is dominant if it is best for the individual regardless of what others do, and clearly it would not be best for a designated contributor to go ahead and contribute if some of the other designees did not do so. This is to say, although contributing is a necessary condition for enjoyment of the public good, it is not a sufficient one; it is only sufficient if it is known for certain that all the others designated as contributors will contribute. Equally, if a designated noncontributor were, for some reason, to go ahead and contribute, the contribution of each member of the designated set would not be critical, and there would be the opportunity for at least one designated contributor to free ride.
Clearly, the argument of criticalness depends on designated contributors (and designated noncontributors) having firm expectations that others will adhere to their roles. We believe, however, that there are good reasons for such expectations. All designated contributors know their own contribution is necessary for provision and, by the same token, should recognize that each other contributor knows that his or her contribution is also necessary. Each might want to free ride, but none has the opportunity to do that, and all know that all others know that for themselves, as well. In short, although the contribution of every designated contributor is necessary for provision, every designated contributor has reason to expect every other designated contributor's contribution to be forthcoming, and therefore to believe that his or her contribution will not be wasted. We believe that the term "reasonable behavior" captures what is involved here. While contributing is not a dominant strategyfor members of a minimal contributing set, it is a reasonable one if reasonableness can be expected from others. And the structure of the game says that it can.
(Notice that designated contributors have grounds, within the presumption of reasonable behavior, to expect designated noncontributors to adhere to their roles, too. Why would a reasonable noncontributor go ahead and contribute when the contributions of reasonable designated contributors will suffice?)
In addition to having simplicity and elegance, this hypothesis has power. Granted that players know what roles have been assigned them, criticalness is all that is needed to ensure optimal provision of the public good. It is not even necessary for the designation to be made in a manner the players like, although in real situations some value will doubtless be assigned to an acceptable process. Selective incentives might work in the same direction, as might a Schelling-point logic, but the logic of criticalness is sufficient to do the job by itself. Optimal provision of the public good with designated contributors contributing and designated noncontributors not contributing becomes an equilibrium solution from which it is in nobody's best interest to deviate (i.e., a "saddle point").
Some Other Consequences
Although efficiency in terms of the public good seems a sufficient justification for construction of the minimal contributing set, other advantages might add to its usefulness.
The minimal contributing set frees individuals from the pushes and pulls of normative constraint and conscience. As Campbell (1975), UllmannMargalit (1977), and others argue, normative pressures and conscience can change the incentives for people in what would otherwise be prisoners' dilemma situations, so that defection is no longer dominant and social optima are reached. But, as Campbell makes particularly explicit, the best that can be expected from these things is a good "pull" in the direction of cooperation with "normatively constrained" behavior being characterized by considerable conflict and difficulty.
With a minimal contributing set specified, however, the need for such a pull evaporates. It is only necessary for those designated as contributors to understand the logic of their position. Then the self-interest that attaches to cooperation will make them cooperate without any help from normative pressures or from conscience and without the conflict that attaches to those things.3 We would, accordingly, expect to find evidence of much more normative conflict when the minimal contributing set is not specified than when it is.
Subjects in all conditions were asked why they had made their particular choice, and their responses were coded4 into the following categories:
Private regardingness. Responses such as "I make more money this way" or "I'm looking after number one" were coded here. (Notice that if norms can be defined as "rules governing behavior," this category might be defined as the "private-regarding norm." We think it is more useful to talk about norms when the egoistic impulse is constrained rather than supported.) Individual-group harmony. Responses in this category pointed out that the behavior in question was desirable for both the individual and the group as a whole; what was best for the individual was also best for the group.
Normative constraint. Responses in this category were in terms of such concepts as fairness, justice, and equity. Individuals gave a clear indication that although they might do better personally via a different choice, they were constrain3Notice that normative constraint and conscience are not only redundant in the context of the minimal contributing set; they would appear to be a positive threat to efficiency. The few instances of overprovision that are recorded in Table 2 (designated noncontributors going ahead and contributing) might be explained in terms of such pressures.
4Responses were coded by a research assistant before we developed an interest in normative constraint. Notice that our interest is in the difference between conditions in terms of explanations that subjects offered for their behavior, not in the absolute incidence of various explanations.
ing that impulse in the interests of the value in question.
Risk. Responses in this category emphasized the respondent's willingness to accept risk, or generally talked about tolerance for risk-or lack of tolerance for it-when returns from choice were dependent on choices made by others.
The group's decision. As we have indicated, the minimal contributing set was produced by some form of group discussion and agreement. In this category we coded responses that made some reference to that agreement, for example: "This is how we decided to do it."
No information. This category includes all responses that were uncodable for some reason, or that were missing. Table 4 reports the incidence of such responses under the no-discussion condition and under the discussion condition where a minimal contributing set was specified. We have distinguished the responses of those who did, in fact, contribute from those who did not, because explanations for the two behaviors were likely to differ substantially. It is apparent that normative constraint was important for contributors when they made their decision without communication; it was not important for them when discussion resulted in specification of a minimal contributing set. It would, of course, have been more satisfactory to have some measure of normative constraint before the behavior in question but, as Barry (1970) points out, there is value in simply asking people the reasons for their behavior. The reasons given here are consistent with our expectation.-The minimal contributing set frees individuals from feelings of risk and uncertainty. Without a minimal contributing set, the decision for a rational and self-interested player may depend in part on the expectations that player has about the behavior of others. (If the required number minus one is expected to contribute, then contribution seems rational. It is not rational if any other number is expected to contribute. However, a player who assumes that each player contributes with the same probability cannot rationally conclude the probability that the number of other "Notice that "the group's decision" was by far the most frequent explanation for behavior by both contributors and noncontributors when the minimal contributing set was specified. This response would appear consistent with any of the hypotheses explaining the success of the minimal contributing set outlined earlier in this article. We do not regard the data presented in this section as providing a test of the criticalness hypothesis, however; they are presented as an elaboration of what might be expected from criticalness. A test of the relative importance of the several other hypotheses must await further experiments.
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The American Political Science Review Vol. 77 contributors equals the required number minus one to be over .5, i.e., there is always less than a 50150 chance that the public good is provided in an optimal way. That is because no single outcome of a binomial process can have an outcome with probability greater than .5.) In this situation, the game is a strategic one and will necessarily involve a measure of risk and uncertainty for all. But with a minimal contributing set, as we have argued, assuming reasonable behavior from others provides a solid basis for predicting what others will do: they will perform as designated. Consequently, feelings of risk and uncertainty should be reduced. It is true that there remains the risk of unreasonable behavior, but this risk does not seem as formidable as the risk and uncertainty associated with rational calculation in the absence of a minimal contributing set. The data presented in Table 4 support this prediction of less experienced risk. As can be seen, risk was never given as a reason for choiceby either contributors or noncontributors-when the minimal contributing set was specified, but it was often mentioned when that set was not specified.
The standard deviation of expectations about others' behavior yields an indicator of uncertainty among our subjects. This is neither a direct nor an unambiguous indicator, because expectations across individuals could be diverse while individual certainty remained high, and vice versa. Nevertheless, a larger between-subject variance in the discussion as compared to the nondiscussion condition would lead to reconsideration of the uncertainty hypothesis. The data in Table 5 report the means and standard deviations for contributors and noncontributors. The standard 'Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) found that contributors expect more contribution than noncontributors. In our data, the mean expectations under the no-discussion condition support this earlier finding. The discussion condition shows deviations from the earlier findings, no doubt because subjects could develop their expectations under better information. Interestingly, these means-especially in the no-discussion condition -suggest that our subjects were, to some extent, tailoring their expectations about the incidence of contributing to the level of contributing that was required for public good provision. The means are always higher when five are required than when three are required. It is as if subjects were confident that "the group" would do what was necessary for "its" own welfare, as if they were thinking more about the incentives confronting the collectivity than about the incentives confronting the individual members of that entity. Although constructing social theory on the basis of concepts like "group mind" obviously transgresses the dictates of analytic individualism, there is no law saying that real people in real situations should not think in such terms-or, indeed, that there is not some reason in rationality for them to do so. The possibility appears particularly interesting in the context of public goods situations when there is a divergence of "individual interest" from "group interest" and when some incidence of contributing is required for all to gain. We believe that the general problem of expectations should be high on the research agenda.
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deviations are invariably lower when the minimal contributing set was specified than when the absence of discussion prevented such a specification. Not even counting the predictions of the eight noncontributors in the five required discussion condition (where there was no variance in expectations), the pooled variance of expectations in the no-discussion condition is eleven times as large as the one in the minimal contributing set condition. This result does not prove greater feelings of uncertainty in the former situation, but it certainly is consistent with that hypothesis. We do not know whether either of these two consequences are of concern to people when they are selecting institutions under which to live, or when they are evaluating those under which they presently live. But it does seem likely that, along with greater game efficiency, they make the minimal contributing set device more attractive.
The Problem of Unreasonable Behavior
If players act unreasonably or have grounds for expecting such behavior from their fellows, the logic of the minimal contributing set could unravel very quickly. Neurotic or unfounded fear of others will, of course, be one source of such expectations. But this is something of a deus ex machine, and the interesting question is whether there are grounds within the logic of reasonableness for players to expect their fellows to act unreasonably.
As Schelling (1960) points out, in some competitive games it will be to the advantage of players to convince their opponents that their own behavior is irrational or erratic. In our mixedmotive games, a player who was designated via discussion as a contributor would profit by persuading a designated noncontributor to change roles, and one way of doing that would be to advertise his or her behavior as likely to be unreasonable. The game that follows will, in all probability, be a tough one that might well end in disaster for all. Each player would be advised (as Schelling points out) to paint himself or herself into a corner so that contribution would be impossible, in which case the public good would not be produced without the other stepping in. The game gets more complex and dangerous still when it is recognized that others, fearing nonprovision but with an interest in free riding on the contribution of someone else, are watching such interaction. Whatever the outcome, the advantages available to the individual from such strategic games might lead reasonable people to fear unreason in their midst and to withdraw their own contributions.
There seems no solution to this problem. Because its origin is in the incentives confronting individuals, there will always be a temptation for indulgence in such games. And because neurotic or unstrategic unreasonable behavior is always a possibility, it will not be possible simply to dismiss all instances of unreasonable behavior as merely strategic.
Size and the Minimal Contributing Set
If occasional instances of genuinely unreasonable behavior are to be expected, there appear to be real size limits to the usefulness of the minimal contributing set. To work, it requires that every member of the group, or at least every member of the contributing set, acts in a reasonable manner. Consequently, a low probability of unreasonable behavior assigned to a representative individual, while perhaps leading to secure feelings about a small group, would surely lead to insecure feelings about a large group.' Perhaps some would be 7Assume all individuals have the same probability p of behaving reasonably. If n individuals behave independently of each other, the probability that all n behave reasonably is pf. For example, if this probability is to be greater than .50 when n = 5, p must be greater than .871; for n = 50, it must be greater than .986. The American Political Science Review Vol. 77 prepared to assign a zero probability to unreasonable behavior for a representative individual, but not many, and a zero probability is what most people would surely require in a group of substantial size. Because anticipation that a designated noncontributor will (unreasonably) contribute can unravel the logic of the device just as surely as anticipation that a designated contributor will (unreasonably) not contribute, it is the unreasonableness of all group members that is a problem. But unreasonable behavior is more to be feared from designated contributors, who, after all, are being asked to pay for the good's provision. Consequently, reducing the size of the contributing set to an absolute minimum might be useful. What is such an absolute minimum? As Olson (1965) points out, the cost of a public good for a large group will, in all probability, be larger than the cost for a small group and, for a fixed cost, there are very definite lower limits to the number of contributing set members.8 But, under some circumstances, it might be possible to organize a hierarchical partition of minimal contributing sets such that the total number of contributors in volved is smaller and, perhaps more important, the number in each one of these sets is relatively quite small. A department of 50 academics might be able to provide itself with a public good (say, the reviewing of 500 applicants for a rare vacancy and development of a five-candidate list for
The assumption of independent choice of behavior is quite reasonable in our context, for even if subjects are allowed to communicate, their choice per se is private. On the other hand, the assumption that p is identical for each subject overestimates the probability that all behave reasonably when the true probabilities vary about an average i. For example, for n = 2, ( 3 + c) (j3 -C) = p2 -< p2. The principle generalizes to n people, because by taking logarithms it reduces to the assertion that the average of logarithms is less than the logarithm of the average (Jensen's inequality).
"For example, using the payoff parameters of our experiments where five players were required to contribute $5 each if the public good were to be provided, the total cost of $25 might have been divided among three members and the good still be provided. Under those circumstances, three subjects might be required to pay $8.33 each for provision, a sum that is less than the $10 benefit returned to all members from provision. But should the specified contributing set have been two only with each sharing the cost equally and paying $12.50 apiece, we would expect refusal and failure of provision. Of course, the larger the specified set, the more readily will its members pay up-the greater is their gain from provision-but the greater will be the danger from occasional unreasonable behavior among those members. review) by organizing a single contributing set but (depending on the value assigned to the short list by department members, and the value to them of their own time) that set might have to be quite large.9 Alternatively, a system of committees and subcommittees could be organized in such a manner that achievement of the overall goal was critically dependent on work done by each of a few subcommittees. Under this structure, it would be possible to keep the contributions of all members relatively low (low enough so that there would still be an incentive to contribute as required) and to eliminate slack at each level. Although it might (or might not) be possible to keep the total number of contributors below what would be necessary for a single contributing set, contributors at each level would have less to fear from unreasonable behavior in their particular context, and the minimal contributing set device would be likely to work more smoothly.
There would, of course, still be problems. Such a hierarchy does nothing about the problem of unreasonable behavior from designated noncontributors; expecting designated noncontributors to step in and do committee or subcommittee work could well lead designated contributors to step out, with all the attendant problems we have discussed. (A willingness to do work for the collectivity is, under these circumstances at least, something of a mixed blessing.) And every general knows that the probability of a mission's failure increases directly with the number of individuals and groups who must perform flawlessly for success to be achieved, just as every (successful) general knows the importance of having his soldiers think each is critical. Nevertheless, such a hierarchical partitioning of the contributing set does seem to be a device by which some of the strengths that the minimal contributing set offers small groups can be transferred to larger groups and organizations.
Conclusion
We have developed a model of the minimal contributing set as a solution to the problem of public good provision for groups. The solution is, admittedly, flawed. Unreasonable behavior remains a problem. Nevertheless, it is attractive for 'In real situations, it will often be possible to select the contributing set with a judicious eye to the interest of different group members in the public good in question. Individuals who value the public good relatively highly will, presumably, be prepared to carry higher costs as members of a contributing set to ensure its provision and, therefore, make possible a smaller contributing set. many reasons. Not only does the minimal contributing set promote optimal provision, but it appears to do so with a minimum of normative pushes and pulls and feelings of risk among players. And further, as our experiments demonstrated, it does not require coercion or selective incentives of any kind to work. A structure that does all this must surely have been discovered before and, we believe, it has: The logic of the minimal contributing set is recognizable in many familiar institutions.
It is not, however, a solution to the whole family of externality problems of which the publicgoods problem is only a member. It is limited to situations in which there is an explicit provision point and would not, therefore, be a solution to such well-known externality problems as Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" (1968). But it does appear to be a solution to those in which a sufficient level of contributions will result in the provision of a public good, and an insufficient level will result in its not being provided.
Instructions
In this experiment, all of you will have the possibility of earning money. The maximum amount is $15 and the minimum amount is ($5) (nothing). How much each of you earns is determined by your group's decision according to certain rules. I will explain the rules now.
As you can see, each of you has before you an identifying letter, from A through G and two types of forms. This is the decision form. And this is the payoff matrix. I will explain the use of each form as we proceed.
A promissory note for $5 is attached to the decision form. Text on the note read: This promissory note for $5 may be redeemed at the end of the experiment according to the rules to be explained by the experiment leader. This was followed by a large rendition for "$5.00. " I am willing to pay each member of this group $10 if Ifivel threel or more of you are willing to make an investment decision that I will describe. I am offering you a chance to invest your $5 note according to the following rules: 1) Your decision to invest or not will be in writing on the decision form.
2) Your decision will be private. None of the other group members will be allowed to know your decision.
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3) You will be asked to write an explanation of your vote on the decision form. This explanation will also be private information. 4) If fivel threel or more of you decide to invest, each of you will be paid $10. If the $10 payoff is provided, even those who do not invest will be paid $10. 5) If fewer than Ifivel threel of you decide to invest, the investors (will have their notes returned to them and everyone will make $5) (will lose their money).
To better understand your investment opportunities, please look at the payoff matrix now. OK, I see that you understand the payoffs as they are related to your decision. At the end of the experiment I will ask you to mark your decision on the decision form and fill out the other information that is requested on the form. ***Before you are asked to do so, you have one minute to make up your mind about the decision.*** ***Before you are asked to do so, you have a maximum of 10 minutes to discuss anything that has to do with your decision in the experiment with your group members.*** I'd like to remind you that your final decision is private. Furthermore, payments will be made to individuals, and no money is allowed to change hands. Now look at the decision form so that I can explain the information that you will fill out. After number one you must mark which letter you have in front of you. This is your identifying letter. After number two you must record your decision. When I ask you to decide, please check the box corresponding to your decision. Before you do that, however, please look at the rest of the ballot. After number three we would like you to explain why you decided to invest or not invest. After number four, please estimate how many of your fellow players will invest their $5. ***After number five we would like you to indicate under the appropriate identifying letter how you believe each of your fellow players will decide. If you believe that an individual player will invest his or her $5, please check the "invest" box in the space below that player's identifying letter. If you believe that the player will not invest, check the "not invest" box under the identifying letter. Make such an estimate for each of the players.*** ***After number five please check the decision you expect from each of the other six players in the appropriate box below. We would also like you to decide what the probability is that your estimate of this is correct. This probability can be any number from .5 to 1.0. It can be interpreted as your degree of certainty about the correctness of your estimate. For example, if you respond that the probability is .6, it means that you believe that there are about six chances out of ten that your estimate is correct for that player. A response of 1.0 means that you are absolutely certain that your estimate is correct. A response of .5 means that your best guess is as likely to be right as wrong. Do not estimate any probability below .5 because you should always be picking the alternative that you think is more likely.*** After number six please indicate your sex.
Are there any questions? Everything clear? ***Take one minute to make your decision. After one minute mark your decision on the decision form and complete the other information.*** ***Then you have a maximum of 10 minutes for discussion. After the discussion you will fill out your decision form in private.*** After you have completed filling out all the required information, please fold your decision form so that no other group members can see what you filled out. After everybody is finished, I will collect the forms and take them to the room in which you signed up for the experiment. Each person will get paid individually one at a time. ***The one minute starts now.*** ***The ten minutes start now.*** ***The experimenter collects the forms. * ***The experimenter monitors the discussion and then collects the form. ***
